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variables are selected arbitrarily their accounting prices could determine sustainability 
in addition to the accounting prices of the economy’s assets. We use our theoretical 
framework to obtain estimates of sustainability conditions in real economies. Thus, the 
paper’s contribution consists in developing a systematic theoretical framework for 
determining value functions, accounting prices and sustainability criteria, under fairly 
general non-optimizing behavioral rules, and then showing that this framework can be 
used in applied work to estimate sustainability conditions. Based on our theoretical 
model, we examined the case of the Greek economy. When there is no binding 
environmental policy then migration rate, growth of capital per worker and exogenous 
technical change are strong positive factors for sustainability. When we introduce 
potential environmental damages due to sulphur dioxide (SO2) emissions, our findings 
indicate that these damages affect negatively the sustainability criterion. 
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Concerns about environmental deterioration and natural resource depletion
have advanced sustainable development as a key concept in policy formula-
tion both at the national and international level. Sustainable development
has been the central concept in the World Conservation Strategy published
in 1980 and the report of the World Commission on Environment and De-
velopment (WCED, 1987) seven years later, and known as the Brundtland
Report. Sustainability has also become a central concept in the policy of the
European Union.
The most commonly used de￿nition of sustainable development now is
that of the Brundtland Report which de￿nes sustainable development as de-
velopment which meets the needs of the present without compromising the
ability of future generations to meet their own needs. This de￿nition stresses
the aspects of intertemporal distribution and intergenerational equity as-
sociated with sustainable development but since it embeds many complex
economic ideas su⁄ers from tractability, especially when it comes to provide
answers to applied questions regarding the sustainability of economics, or the
design and evaluation of sustainable development policies.
In the attempt to make the de￿nition of sustainable development oper-
ational and useful for the development of sustainability criteria and the de-
sign of sustainable policies, many auxiliary de￿nitions have been developed.
These de￿nitions identify conditions which when satis￿ed, an economy can be
regarded as following a path of sustainable development. The most prevailing
of these de￿nitions (Pezzey 2004) associate sustainable paths with:
1. achieving constant utility (Solow 1974; Hartwick 1977).
2. avoiding any decline in utility (Pearce, Markandya and Barbier, 1989;
Pezzey 1992, 1997).
3. avoiding any decline in the present value from time t and onwards of a
Ramsey-Koopmans intergenerational social welfare. (Riley, 1980; Das-
gupta and M￿ler, 2000; Pemberton and Ulph, 2002; Arrow, Dasgupta
and M￿ler 2003b).
1The concept of non declining social welfare or non declining well being is
used to interpret sustainability as maintenance of social welfare. As shown
by Arrow, Dasgupta and M￿ler (2003b) sustainable development de￿ned in
this context implies, and is implied by, the maintenance of the economy￿ s
productive base. This means that each generation should bequeath to each
successor at least as large a productive base as it inherited from its prede-
cessors. For this to be achieved, the productive base of the economy should
be preserved for the future generations. The productive base includes a list
of assets such as manufactured capital, human capital, natural capital and
knowledge. If genuine investment, de￿ned as the sum of the investment in
the above forms of capital, valued at accounting prices, is non-decreasing
over time, then social welfare is also non-decreasing and development is sus-
tainable. This concept of sustainability can be regarded as corresponding to
the weak sustainability concept (Hediger 1999).
One of the advantages of this de￿nition of sustainable development, is
that it can be extended to a very general framework which does not depend
on whether optimizing or non optimizing behavior is assumed, and which
can be used to provide empirical estimations regarding the sustainability
conditions for an economy. There is a clear distinction between optimiz-
ing and non-optimizing economy ￿rst illustrated by Dasgupta and M￿ler. A
non-optimizing economy is an economy where the government whether by de-
sign or incompetence does not choose policies that maximize intergenerational
welfare. The term sustainable development acquires particular bite when it
is put to work in imperfect economies, that is economies su⁄ering from weak
or even bad governance1.
If we assume that the economy can be described by a dynamic system
with the state variables corresponding to assets and the control variables
to policy instruments,2 then the paths of the assets are determined by the
way that instruments are chosen. The paths of the state variables determine
the value function for the economy, which is social welfare as de￿ned by
1Arrow , Dasgupta and M￿ler, 2003(b).
2For example in growth models, consumption is a control variable or a policy instru-
ment, and the stock of capital is a state variable..
2the Ramsey-Koopmans (or felicity) functional at a given point in time. The
value function is a function of the initial values of the assets. If the time
derivative of the value function is non negative, then social welfare is also
non-decreasing and development is sustainable at this point in time.
The future paths of the assets will be optimal, if controls are chosen
optimally in order to maximize the social welfare functional. However, as
indicated by Arrow, Dasgupta and M￿ler (2003), the economy￿ s value func-
tion, and its time evolution is well de￿ned for non-optimal choices of the
instruments. This makes possible to de￿ne conditions for sustainable devel-
opment in a general context and to provide a basis for empirical estimations.
It is clear that by choosing the structure of the dynamic system describ-
ing the economy it is possible to highlight the impact of di⁄erent factors on
sustainability. Arrow, Dasgupta and Maler (2003b) focus on issues such as
non-convexities, natural resources, exogenous productivity growth, human
capital, while Arrow, Dasgupta and M￿ler (2003a), Asheim (2004) link pop-
ulation change with sustainable development in an optimizing framework.
The present paper follows this methodological approach and seeks to pro-
vide a well de￿ned theoretical framework for determining sustainability cri-
teria for non optimizing economies, which can also be used to provide a basis
for empirical estimations. We believe that since, especially for developing
countries, there is no reason to assume that observed data are generated by
optimizing processes, the non optimizing framework, properly de￿ned, will
be very useful both for purposes of theoretical foundations of sustainability
criteria under alternative hypotheses about the structure and the objectives
of the economy, and for empirical estimations.
Using the non-optimizing theoretical framework, we derive the (weak)
sustainability criterion when controls are chosen according to some feedback
rule.3 We also show that when controls (or policy instruments) are cho-
sen in an arbitrary way which is independent of the stock of assets4, the
non-declining social welfare sustainability criterion, depends not only on the
3A feedback rule in this context is a behavioral or other arbitrary rule according to
which instruments are determined in relation to the values of the state variables.
4This implies a non-feedback way of choosing the controls.
3growth of the assets and their corresponding accounting prices, but also on
the arbitrary paths of the controls. In this case the value function for the
economy depends both on current stocks and current ￿ ows. These results
suggest that in certain cases of non optimizing economies with arbitrary
choices of controls, positive genuine investment in assets might not be en-
tirely appropriate for characterizing sustainable development paths. Thus,
genuine investment should be adjusted for the growth of the arbitrary chosen
policy variables, such as for example emission limits.
This theoretical framework is then applied to data from a real economy
with the purpose of providing estimates of sustainability conditions. Thus
the paper￿ s contribution, in the long discussion about sustainability, con-
sists of developing a systematic theoretical framework for determining value
functions, accounting prices and sustainability criteria, under fairly general
non-optimizing behavioral rules, and then showing that this framework can
be used in applied work to estimate sustainability conditions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section pro-
vides the framework for determining sustainability criteria in the case of
a non-optimizing economy under a feedback, or an arbitrary rule of policy
instruments￿choice. In each case the economy is described by a dynamic
system, the corresponding value function is de￿ned, and the sustainability
criterion for each case is presented. We also provide a de￿nition according
to which a policy is promoting sustainability if it implies a relative higher
growth of social welfare relative to another policy. We next consider stylized
economies without optimizing behavior. In this framework, domestic popula-
tion growth, migration, labour augmenting technical change, environmental
damages associated with pollutant ￿ ows generated by economic activities are
taken into account in determining the sustainability conditions. In the same
context we use a performance standard that determines an upper limit for
the emissions of a pollutant and analyze the structure of the value function
and accounting prices under an arbitrary environmental policy.
We use our theoretical model to explore the current sustainability con-
ditions within the Greek economy. Our ￿ndings suggest that in the case
where environmental considerations are not taken into account, or there is
4no binding environmental policy, migration, the rate of growth of capital per
worker and exogenous technical change are strong positive factors supporting
sustainability for the Greek economy. When we introduce potential environ-
mental damages due to sulphur dioxide (SO2) emissions, our ￿ndings indicate
that environmental damages a⁄ect negatively the sustainability criterion. In
particular sustainability depends on the parameter which re￿ ects the mar-
ginal environmental damages in Greece due to SO2 emissions. For su¢ ciently
high marginal environmental damages the Greek economy is not sustainable
according to the non declining social welfare criterion. When considering the
case of a possible performance standard in SO2 emissions- a case correspond-
ing to a binding environmental policy - the accounting value of the emission
limit enters the sustainability criterion as suggested by the theoretical model.
The e⁄ect of the standard on sustainability depends on the relative strength
of its e⁄ects on production and environmental conditions.
The main empirical ￿nding is that the Greek economy seems to be cur-
rently on a sustainable development path if no environmental considerations
are taken into account. When such damages are considered, there are neg-
ative e⁄ects on the sustainability conditions. The last section of the paper
concludes.
2 Sustainability Criteria in Non-optimizing
Economies
Following Arrow, Dasgupta and Maler (2003a) we assume that social welfare





￿￿(￿￿t)U (x(￿);u(￿))d￿ ;￿ ￿ t (1)
where x =(x1;:::;xn) denotes a vector of state variables, which can be in-
terpreted as stocks of assets and u =(u1;:::;um) denotes a vector of con-
trol variables, which can be interpreted as policy instruments. The function
U (x(￿);u(￿)) can be interpreted as the welfare of the generation living at
5time ￿; under appropriate assumptions about the growth of the population,
as it will become clear in the following sections.
The evolution of the economy is described by a system of transition equa-
tions linking the state and the control variables.
_ x￿ = f (u(￿);x(￿)) ; x(t) = xt ;￿ ￿ t (2)
In an optimizing economy the control paths u(￿) are chosen to maximize
(1) subject to the constraints imposed by the transition equations (2). In a
non optimizing economy the choice of the controls could be determined by a
feedback rule u(￿) = g (x(￿)) which might re￿ ect behavioral characteristics
of the economy, or some feedback policy rule.
In the Solow model of economic growth, consumption, which is interpreted
as a control variable, is a constant fraction of output which is determined,
through the aggregate production function, by the capital stock which is the
state variable. This constant fraction is a behavioral parameter. Thus in
Solow￿ s model consumption is determined by a feedback rule. Furthermore,
feedback controls can be chosen to stabilize the economic system, around
some desirable steady state,5 or can be chosen to steer the system to certain
state vector in ￿nite time.6
Alternatively the choice of controls can be determined in completely ar-
bitrary way, by exogenous factors, such as domestic political conditions, his-
toric trends or international conditions. In this case the control paths will
be u(￿) = ￿ u(￿)
Consider the system of transition equations (2) under the feedback rule,
or the arbitrary rule respectively:
_ x￿ = f (g(x(￿));x(￿);b) ; x(t) = xt (3)
_ x￿ = f (￿ u(￿);x(￿);b) ; x(t) = xt (4)
5In ths case the feedback function is chosen so that the steady state is stable in the
Lyapunov sense.
6In this case the feedback function is chosen so that the system starting from the
initial point x0; reaches the terminal state xT; at ￿nite time T: It is assumed that the
rank conditions for controllability are satis￿ed.
6where b is a vector of exogenous parameters. Solutions to these systems,
provided they exist, will be in general of the form:
x￿ = ￿(￿ ￿ t;xt;b); (5)
x￿ =   (￿ ￿ t;xt;￿ u;b) (6)
Substituting the solutions (5) or (6) into (1) we obtain the value function
of the system as a function of the initial state vector xt; and possibly the
vector of arbitrary controls ￿ u(￿):If the arbitrary control path can be written






￿￿(￿￿t)U (g(￿(￿ ￿ t;xt;b));￿(￿ ￿ t;xt;b))d￿(7)




￿￿(￿￿t)U (￿ u(￿ ￿ t;￿ ut);  (￿ ￿ t;xt;b))d￿ (8)









If we use the non-declining social welfare de￿nition of sustainable devel-
opment which requires that
dVt
dt
￿ 0 we obtain the following result:
Proposition 1 Consider a non-optimizing economy with xi; i = 1;:::n as-
sets and uj; j = 1;:::;m policy instruments. (i) If policy instruments are
chosen following feedback rules associated with the assets of the economy,
then sustainability depends on the assets growth and their corresponding ac-
counting prices. (ii) If policy instruments are chosen arbitrarily then sus-
tainability depends both on the assets and the policy instruments growth and
their corresponding accounting prices.
Proof. (i) Di⁄erentiating (7) totally with respect to time we obtain that
7This implies that the control is chosen according to some arbitrary time dependent
rule, for example z% increase relative to the previous year.










































It should be noticed that part (ii) of the above proposition shows that
in arbitrary non optimizing economies - that is economies where instruments
are chosen without any relationship to assets - sustainability depends on the
growth of these instruments too. Thus the growth of the instruments af-







represents genuine investment, our results implies that in
time autonomous economies, where
@Vt
@t
= 0; positive genuine investment
does not imply that development is sustainable. To fully assess sustain-
ability the impacts of instrument should be also taken into account. In this
sense Proposition 1 extends previous results about non optimizing economies,
where sustainable development depended on genuine investment alone. This
result can be associated for example with the introduction of environmental
policy, which in real world can be regarded most of the times as arbitrary. Let










preted as the contribution of a changing emission limit to the sustainability
criterion.




= 0; the value function (8) depends on the vector of parameters ￿ u and
is written as Vt (xt;￿ u): In this case we can still de￿ne the accounting price
for the instrument, althought the sustainability criterion does not depend
8directly on ￿ u but indirectly, through the accounting prices for assets. These
accounting prices can be written as: ptxi (￿ u) = @Vt (xt;￿ u)=@xit:
It should be noticed that criteria (10), and (11) are de￿ned for the current
period t: A positive value for SF
t or SA
t implies that the economy is currently
sustainable. The economy will be sustainable for the entire future horizon if:
S
l
￿ ￿ 0; for all ￿ ￿ t ;l = F or A (12)
Given however the arbitrary choice of instruments, and the associated arbi-
trary paths for the state variables, this might not be feasible. For example
if an arbitrary policy leads to the exhaustion of an essential asset then esti-
mates of (10) or (11) obtained by using the current changes in assets dxit=dt
might indicate that the economy is currently sustainable. The economy will
not however be sustainable according to (12). Therefore for empirical pur-
poses which use current estimates of the asset￿ s growth rates to obtain an
estimate of the criterion (10) or (11), it might be more appropriate to de-
￿ne a "bounded" sustainability criterion, which is de￿ned for a ￿nite time
horizon, within which there is a certain con￿dence in the estimates of the
assets￿growth rates obtained from the economy￿ s data. The criterion should
be reestimated as time goes by, so that possible unexpected e⁄ects of the
arbitrary policy rules are realized.
Using the de￿nitions (7) and (8) and the argument for a bounded crite-




















[U (￿ u(￿ ￿ t;￿ ut);  (￿ ￿ t;xt;b))]d￿ (14)
where T ￿ 1: Furthermore the impact from changes in a parameter bv on


























9The sustainability criteria (10), (11) along with the de￿nitions of
accounting prices (13) and (14) can be used to de￿ne a rule for evaluating
current policies according to their impact on sustainable development. Con-
sider two alternative feedback rules (g1 (x(￿));g2 (x(￿))); or two arbitrary
policies (￿ u1 (￿);￿ u2 (￿)): Then the corresponding sustainability criteria will













De￿nition 1: A policy either in a feedback form g1 (x(￿)) or in an
arbitrary form ￿ u1 (￿) is said to promote sustainable development, relative to










According to this de￿nition a policy is promoting current sustainability
if it implies a relative higher growth of social welfare. If policy 2 is the
status quo then (15) it can be used to evaluate new policies with respect
to their impact on sustainable development. De￿nition 1 can also be used
to assess whether a change in an exogenous parameter promotes sustainable
development or not.8
3 The Value Function and Accounting Prices
in a non Optimizing Economy
In this context, our intention is to set up a model which would examine the
sustainability of an economy that posses a number of characteristics which
are common in reality. We consider therefore economies, where domestic pop-
ulation growth, migration in￿ ows or out￿ ows, labour augmenting technical
change and environmental damages associated with pollutant ￿ ows gener-
ated by economic activities are present. Thus, although we are dealing with
a stylized model important characteristics of modern economies such as mi-
gration, technical change and environmental pollution are taken into account
in determining the sustainability conditions.
8If for example, parameter bm changes from bm1 to bm2; the change promotes sustain-
ability if SF (bm2) ￿ SF (bm1):
10In particular, given the importance that migration ￿ ows have played in
the history of economic development, it is interesting to determine the contri-
bution of migration to the sustainability conditions of an economy, along with
technical change and environmental pollution. Migration is a phenomenon
that a⁄ects an economy￿ s population and labor supply. Migration represents
gains in population for the destination economy and at the same time losses
for the source economy. The movement of a person entails the movement of
his human capital and that is the reason why migration also implies some
degree of capital mobility9.
Let M (t) be the ￿ ow of migrants into the domestic economy. If Nl (t) is













n = n + m; where n is the rate of growth of the domestic labour force
and m is the migration rate. Then, the evolution of the total labour force in
the country is determined by:
N￿ = Nte
~ n(￿￿t);￿ ￿ t (16)
If m > 0; this means that there is an in￿ ow of immigrants in the destina-
tion economy whereas if m < 0; then there is an out￿ ow. Let z be the capital
de￿ned in the broad sense of each person, immigrant or emigrant. If z = 0;
this means that the immigrants or the emigrants do not come with human
capital such as special skills or education, or any other type of capital, and
this can be interpret as migration which does not support any type of capital
movement. In this case there is only labour force change and not human or
physical capital mobility. If z 6= 0 that means that migration also includes
some kind capital mobility.
Capital accumulation in our stylized economy is described by using the
standard Solow model. We assume that exogenous technical change of labour
augmenting type (Harrod neutral technical change) is present. This means
that the aggregate production function can be written as Y = F (K;AN);




= g; which is the rate of exogenous technical change and ^ L =
AN which is e⁄ective labour. Using the standard Cobb-Douglas production
function Y = Ka (AN)
1￿a the accumulation of capital, measured in per
e⁄ective worker terms, with ^ k = K
AN; with ^ y = ^ ka and m de￿ned as the
migration rate, is given by (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995):
￿
^ kt = s^ k
a
t ￿ (￿ + ￿ + g)^ kt ￿ m^ kt + z
setting z = 0 we obtain:
￿
^ kt + (￿ + ￿ + m + g)^ kt = s^ k
a
t (17)
Then capital accumulation is described by a Bernoulli di⁄erential equation















;￿ ￿ t ;! = (￿ + ￿ + m + g) (18)
Since in the Solow model consumption is a ￿xed proportion of output,11 we
have, in per e⁄ective worker terms:



















Environment is introduced into the model by the variable P; which is
interpreted as pollution which a⁄ects utility in a negative way. Then the
utility function becomes a function of per capita consumption c￿ and total
pollution P￿ and is assumed, as it is common in this type of analysis, to have
10For the solution see the Appendix.
11In the terminology of the previous section, consumption is a feedback control.
12the following separable speci￿cation:
U (c￿;P￿) = ￿c
￿(￿￿1)
￿ ￿ D(P￿) (21)
In (21) ￿￿ is the elasticity of marginal utility, with ￿ > 1; and P￿ can be
interpreted as pollution which creates disutility. Therefore D(P￿) can be
interpreted as a damage function assumed strictly increasing and convex.
We specify the damage function as D(P￿) = ￿P ￿
￿ with ￿ > 0 and ￿ ￿ 1:
Since the production structure is determined in per e⁄ective worker terms,
we need to specify the utility function (21) in per e⁄ective worker terms. If
we de￿ne consumption per e⁄ective worker as ^ c =
C
AN
; from the de￿nition
of per capita consumption we have:
C￿
N￿









and the utility function (21) becomes:







We assume that pollution is of the ￿ ow type and that the ￿ ow of pollution is
related to output production by a strictly increasing function P￿ = ￿(Y￿):
In terms of the discussion in section 2, pollution is also a form of a feedback
control, since by using the production function to substitute for output it
can be written as a function of the capital stock. The feedback rule can be
associated with technical conditions which determine completely, in the ab-
sence of environmental policy, the evolution of emissions. The ￿(￿) function




xt;￿ > 0;￿ > 0 (23)
13where x re￿ ects technical change in pollution generation. A negative x re-
￿ ects pollution reducing technical change. Since in per e⁄ective worker terms,








; ~ n = n + m; by substituting Y￿ in (23)






























The ￿ ow of total utility in the economy is N￿U(c￿;P￿); therefore the value





￿￿(￿￿t)N￿U(^ k￿;N￿;A￿)dt ;T ￿ 1 ;N￿ = Nte
~ n(￿￿t) (25)
It should be noted that the value function depends only on the current




and the parameters de-
scribing the structure of the economy.





















the accounting price of capital in physical units
and per capita units is de￿ned respectively as:
12A more complex structure would require, additional transition equations for, say,
natural resources (depletable or renewable), stocks of pollutants, human capital and so
on. In this case the value function would depend on the current values of the stocks for
these assets. The development of such a dynamic system, with the associated feedback or
arbitrary rules and its solution, so that the value function can be de￿ned in an operational



















It should be noted that in this case there is no speci￿c accounting price for
pollution since pollution is not a stock, but the impact of pollution is realized
through the accounting price of capital pt^ kt = @Vt=@^ kt which depends on the
parameters of the damage function.
3.1 Sustainability in the presence of environmental pol-
icy.
Assume that the environmental policy is expressed through a performance
standard that determines an upper limit for the emissions of the ￿rms. Since


















the emission limit will take the form:
P￿ ￿ ￿ P (30)












The ￿rm considers the interest rate r and the wage rate w as ￿xed and
chooses capital, for any ￿xed level of e⁄ective labour AN to maximize (31)


































= r + ￿ ;^ k
￿
￿ > 0 (33)
￿
h













= 0 ;￿ ￿ 0 (34)
If the emission constraint is not binding then ￿ = 0 and the solution ^ k￿ is




= r + ￿:13 Under concavity of the
production function and Inada conditions a unique solution always exists. If
￿ > 0 then the constraint is binding and the capital stock is determined as
a function of the emission limit by the solution of:



















Thus a more stringent emission limit will reduce the stock of capital. This





to the left. As a result ^ k￿
￿ < ^ k￿ and the binding performance standard
reduces the equilibrium stock of capital. It can be also noticed that if x < 0
so that we have emission saving technical change then the reduction of the
equilibrium stock of capital, under the performance standard will be smaller,
the larger this type of technical change is. Since capital stock is relatively
reduced from a binding performance standard or equivalently from a more
stringent performance standard, output is also reduced ceteris paribus. This




































be the output of the economy under the performance
standard ￿ P: Then consumption in per e⁄ective worker terms is de￿ned as














= ^ c￿( ￿ P) (38)
then the per capita utility ￿ ow in the economy will be:
U
￿












In empirical applications, where the main purpose will be to examine the
impact of a performance standard on the sustainability of the economy a






is unlikely due to data limitations. In this case
an approach could be to assume that the reduced output under the binding
standard is approximately proportional to the output obtained without a




















can be interpreted as full capacity output, without
environmental constraints.14 Under the Cobb-Douglas assumption, we have:
^ y = (1 ￿ z ￿ P)^ k
a
In this case the accumulation of capital in per e⁄ective worker terms is:
￿
^ kt = s(1 ￿ z ￿ P)^ k
a
t ￿ (￿ + ￿ + g)^ kt ￿ m^ kt + z
setting z = 0 as before we obtain:
￿
^ kt + (￿ + ￿ + m + g)^ kt = s(1 ￿ z ￿ P)^ k
a
t (41)
14For an estimate of the proportion of output lost due to environmetal regulation in the
US economy see Jorgenson and Wilcoxen (1998)
















! = ￿ + ￿ + m + g (43)
Therefore, ^ c￿ = (1 ￿ s)(1 ￿ z ￿ P)^ ka
￿ = ^ c￿
￿
^ k￿;z ￿ P
￿




















￿ ￿ ￿ P
￿
￿
dt ;T ￿ 1
The current accounting price for the performance standard ￿ P can be calcu-
lated as:









U(^ k￿;N￿;A￿; ￿ P;z ￿ P)dt
Thus, there is a speci￿c accounting price for the arbitrary control ￿ P.
4 The Sustainability Criterion in a Non Op-
timizing Economy
Based on the results of Proposition 1 the sustainability criterion for our styl-
ized economy with produced capital, exogenous technical change, migration
and pollution which, in the absence of environmental policy, can be expressed
in a feedback form, implies that this economy follows a weakly sustainable









15See Appendix for details
18Dividing by Nk; where k =
K
N










and that the accounting price for capital in physical terns is related to the

























where S1t measures the change in the value of the economy per unit of pro-
duced capital stock at time t: Thus S1t could be interpreted as the rate of
return on produced capital measured in terms of social welfare. It is clear
that by multiplying S1t by the current stock of capital we obtain a measure








= ~ n = n+m; with
m S 0 depending on the migration rate, and denoting the rate of growth of
per capital per worker
_ k
k















When an arbitrary environmental policy in the form of the emission limit ￿ P
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where ￿ is the rate of growth of the emission limit, with ￿ < 0 indicating that
environmental policy becomes gradually more stringent and ￿ > 0 indicating
that environmental policy is becoming more lax. As before, by multiplying
S2t by the current stock of capital we obtain a measure of current genuine
investment. In this case genuine investment is adjusted for the changes in
environmental policy, a required adjustment that has not been noticed in
earlier literature.
195 Exploring Sustainability Conditions within
the Greek Economy
The stylized model developed above is used to explore the current sustain-
ability conditions within the Greek economy. To apply the model we need
estimates of the parameters required to de￿ne the value functions (25) or
(44).
Our approach was to estimate, using econometric estimations, the para-
meters that correspond to structural relations and to assign plausible values
to those parameters that econometric estimation was not possible. For these
parameters we used sensitivity analysis to ensure the robustness of our re-
sults.
The parameters required in order to estimate criterion (45), (47) are: n
the rate of growth of domestic labour force and m the migration rate; v the
rate of growth of capital per worker; g the rate of growth of labour augment-
ing technological change; s which expresses savings as proportion of Greek
GDP in the period analyzed; a which is the parameter of the production
function re￿ ecting the elasticity of capital input; ￿ which represents the dis-
count rate; ￿ the elasticity of marginal utility the value of which re￿ ects
preferences towards equality in income distribution; ￿ which is the depre-
ciation rate; ￿ and ￿ which are the parameters of the postulated damage
function D(P￿) = ￿P ￿
￿ ; ￿; ￿ and x which are the parameters of the emission
function P￿ = ￿Y ￿
￿ ext; and ￿nally when we need to examine the impact of
an emission limit, the potential reduction in GDP due to the emission limit,
is the parameter z ￿ P. It was assumed in the absence of any data that z; the
capital brought in Greece by migrants, was zero.
The fundamental data for the Greek economy were GDP, Capital, and
Labour,16 measured in million 1990US$ and thousands of workers respec-
tively, using data from the Penn- tables for the period 1965-1990.We obtain
the average annual growth rates of these variables in physical units and in
16In modeling the production structure we consider labour augmenting technical change.
We do not introduce human capital so our sustainability characteristics do not include
human capital aspects but include labour augmenting technical change.
20per capita terms during the sample period by estimating the relationship:
lnxt = ao + a1t (48)
where xt is the variable of interest and t takes values t = 1;:::;T during the
sample period.17
The estimates of the growth rates for the variable of interest in physical
and in per worker terms are shown in the tables below.
Rates of Growth 1965-1990 % per year
Capital (K) 5:55
GDP (Y ) 3:64
Labour (N) 0:6
Next we estimated the rates of growth in per worker terms and the results
are presented in the table below:
Rates of Growth in per worker terms1965-1990 % per year
Capital, k 4:95
GDP, y 3:035
The basic structural relationships were the aggregate production function
for the economy and the emission function (23).
The estimates from the production function are used to determine the
elasticity of capital with respect to output, which is the parameter a; and
the rate of labour augmenting technical change g: We assume the existence
of a constant returns to scale Cobb-Douglas long run aggregate production
function for the Greek economy, de￿ned over man made capital and e⁄ective









qt ;q = g (1 ￿ a))
17Relationship (48) corresponds to the standard exponential growth model xt = Aoea1t:
18It is clear the in per worker terms this function becomes ^ yt = B^ ka
t ; which is the
function used with B = 1 in the previous sections.
21The statistical model can be written as:
lnyt = lnB + alnkt + qt + "t ;t = 1;:::;T (49)
where "t is the usual error term. The production function (49) can be in-
terpreted as a long run equilibrium relationship that shifts in time as it is
a⁄ected by technical change. To test for the existence of such equilibrium
relationship we test for the existence of a cointegrating relationship. The
Johansen cointegration test19 suggest that both the trace and the maximum
eigenvalue tests indicate one cointegrating relationship with constant and
deterministic trend at 5% level.
Next we use OLS to estimate (49). The results are summarized in the
table below:
Variable Coe¢ cient Std. Error t-Statistic
lnB 1:438115 0:187444 7:672226
lnk 0:402501 0:080129 5:023150




These results imply that the elasticity of capital input is a = 0:4025;





For the emission function we used sulfur dioxide emissions (SO2); which is
a pollutant with ￿ ow characteristics, measured in annual emissions in kilotons
covering the period 1980 ￿ 1999, (Source: European Environment Agency,
Copenhagen). These emission were related to output, assuming an emission
function of the constant elasticity form. (23).The results we obtained were
the following:
Variable Coe¢ cient Std. Error t-Statistic
constant 4:156018 2:289511 1:815243
lnY 0:225308 0:241803 0:931786
19See software package e-views.




The emission relationship was regarded as a technological relationship.
Estimates were corrected for ￿rst order serial correlation, which turned out
to be highly signi￿cant. A trend term which could indicate technical change
associated with SO2 emissions was highly insigni￿cant.
To complete the set of required parameters we require the migration ￿ ow
m, the marginal propensity to save s, the discount rate ￿, the depreciation
rate ￿; the elasticity of marginal utility ￿; the parameters of the damage
function, and the parameter z ￿ P when we examine the impact of an emission
limit.
For the migration rate a recent study (Lianos 2003)20 indicates that be-
tween1991 and 2001 the number of immigrants who entered the Greek econ-
omy is around 630:000, assuming an average annual ￿ ow of M (t) = 60:000
and dividing by the average value of number of workers in the same period




For the marginal propensity to save we use the average value for the
period 1970 - 1990 of savings as a proportion of GDP, with s = 0:21.21.
The depreciation rate was taken ￿ = 3% following Mankiw, Romer and
Weil (1992);the discount rate at ￿ = 3%; and the elasticity of marginal
utility at ￿ = 3 which re￿ ects relatively strong preferences towards equal
income distribution. The parameter ￿ of the damage function was set, ￿ = 1:
This implies a linear damage function in which ￿ re￿ ects marginal damages.
Since the units of output and consumption were million US $, ￿ re￿ ects the
environmental damages in Greece, in million US$; from the emissions of one
kiloton of sulphur dioxide in a year. In the absence of any information the
value of ￿ was taken in the interval [10￿6;10￿3] indicating damages from 1
US$ to 1000 US$ per kiloton of sulphur dioxide a year. For the parameter
20KEPE, Study 51, T. Lianos . Sygxroni Metanasteusi stin Ellada: Oikonomikh
Diereynish.
21For the date see "The Greek Economy in Figures 2002". page 105.
23z ￿ P there is no information for the Greek economy. Jorgenson and Wilcoxen
(1998), using a computable general equilibrium approach, estimated the cost
of all environmental restrictions for the US economy, to be 2:592% of real
GNP, so we set z ￿ P at a conservative value of 1%.
The parameter values used are summarized in the following table:
Parameter n m v g s a ￿ ￿ ￿
V alue 0:006 0:015 0:0495 0:009 0:21 0:4025 0:03 0:03 3
Parameter
V alue
￿ ￿ x ￿ ￿ z ￿ P
0:225 4:146 0 1 [10￿6;10￿3] 0:01
Using the above parameters accounting prices were calculated with nu-
merical integration of the derivatives of the value function22 for a time hori-
zon of 100 years.23 Two set of results were obtained, one set corresponding to
emissions determined by a feedback rule through the emission function and
using the criterion (45) and another one regarding the 1999 sulphur dioxide
emissions as an upper emission limit and using (47).
Table 1 below shows accounting prices and the sustainability criterion for
di⁄erent marginal damages, when there is no binding environmental policy.
Table1: Accounting Prices and the Sustainability Criterion
m ￿ pK pN pA S1
0 0 0:0011216 ￿0:0464493 315:511 0:00007839
0:015 0 0:00238486 ￿0:125464 852:225 0:00142968
0:015 10￿6 0:00238326 ￿0:126324 851:689 0:0001411
0:015 10￿5 0:00237046 ￿0:134064 846:860 0:00013461
0:015 10￿4 0:00224252 ￿0:21147 798:574 0:00005950
0:015 10￿3 0:00096316 ￿0:985523 315:712 ￿0:0006916
We can observe from the table above that for marginal environmental
damages below 1000 US$ per kiloton the Greek economy is currently on a
sustainable path. Furthermore it is clear that migration has played an im-
portant role in the current sustainability conditions of the Greek economy,
22Mumerical results were obtained by using Mathematica.
23This time horizon is quite long. Thus the results should be interpreted as if the
fundamental structure of the economy would remain approximately the same within this













since the criterion is reduced substantially when we set m = 0: Further-
more the accounting prices have the expected signs and the sustainability
criterion is declining in environmental damages as expected. For su¢ ciently
high marginal environmental damages the criterion becomes negative. Thus
the sustainability conditions for the Greek economy are sensitive to environ-
mental damages. Multiplying the S1 column by the stock of capital we can
obtain an estimate of the genuine investment in Greece for di⁄erent values
of marginal environmental damages.
The following diagram represents the values of ￿ and the sustainability
criterion S1.24
Table 2 shows accounting prices and the sustainability criterion as if the
emission limit for sulphur dioxide has been set at the 1999 emission level,
which was 541 kilotons. Values have been calculated for m = 0:015 and
z = 0:01
Table 2: Accounting Prices and the Sustainability Criterion under an
Emission Limit












￿ pK pN pA p ￿ P pz ￿ P S2
10￿6 0:002445 ￿0:134 837:99 ￿0:03396 ￿1107:63 0:0001412
10￿5 0:002445 ￿0:183 837:99 ￿0:33963 ￿1107:63 0:0001047
10￿4 0:002445 ￿0:669 837:99 ￿3:33963 ￿1107:63 ￿0:000266
10￿3 0:002445 ￿5:559 837:99 ￿33:963 ￿1107:63 ￿0:003962
In the above table the column p ￿ P refers to
@V
@ ￿ P
which is the accounting
price for the emission standard. This price is negative as expected, since an
increase in ￿ P that is a more lax environmental policy, is expected to reduce
the economy￿ s value, if z ￿ P remains constant. The column pz ￿ P refers to
@V
@z ￿ P
which is negative as expected. This means that if the cost of the standard in
terms of output foregone increases then the economy￿ s value is reduced ceteris
paribus. Since lax standard is expected to reduce z ￿ P the ￿nal outcome from a
change in the performance standard on the value of the economy depends on
the expression @V
@ ￿ P d ￿ P + @V
@z ￿ P dz ￿ P: Again as expected the sustainability criterion
is declining in marginal environmental damages. The following ￿gure shows
again the ￿;S2 relationship for the performance standard case.
266 Concluding Remarks
This paper aimed at developing the concept of sustainable development in
a systematic framework, with the purpose of providing an applicable and
operational de￿nition of sustainability. This attempt had the intention to try
and satisfy today￿ s needs for de￿ning and evaluating sustainability policies.
For this purpose we tried to determine an operational and measurable
criterion for sustainable development that would ￿t into a non-optimizing
economic framework. We consider such a non-optimizing framework as ad-
equately representing current economic structures. By considering two dif-
ferent approaches for choosing policy instruments, a feedback rule and an
arbitrary rule, we determined two criteria for sustainable development which
could be applicable and measurable in applied work. In particular we consid-
ered economies, where domestic population growth, migration, labour aug-
menting technical change, environmental damages associated with pollutant
￿ ows generated by economic activities are taken into account in determining
the sustainability conditions.
The developed sustainability criteria were further applied to the case of
the Greek economy and empirical estimates were obtained. Our ￿ndings con-
￿rmed that our theoretical framework can be used for empirical purposes.
In particular our results show that migration in￿ ows, exogenous technical
change, growth of capital per worker and SO2 emissions are important fac-
tors characterizing the sustainability conditions for the Greek economy. Our
approach allows to estimate the contributions of these factors in the achieve-
ment of a sustainable path, information which is undoubtedly useful for the
design and evaluation of sustainable development policies. The main em-
pirical ￿nding is that although the Greek economy seems to be ￿rmly on a
sustainable development path if no environmental considerations are taken
into account, considering such damages has undoubtedly negative e⁄ects on
the sustainability conditions. If marginal damages due to emissions are suf-
￿ciently high then the economy is not on a sustainable path. Thus our
empirical results for the case of Greece come to reinforce the perception that
pollution - in this case SO2 emissions - is an important factor which a⁄ects
27natural environment and consequently the sustainability conditions of the
economy. A more precise quanti￿cation of these e⁄ects, is an open research
area.
Admittedly sustainable development as a general de￿nition, does not pro-
vide a systematic framework for policy design. The present paper is an at-
tempt to make the de￿nition operational and capable of providing empirical
estimates of sustainability conditions with a ￿rm foundation on the structure
of the economy. Thus important fundamentals, such as the elasticity of the
production function, the rate of technical change, migration, environmental
damages, assets￿rates of growth, play a key role in estimating sustainability
conditions. The model developed in this paper can be extended and become
more realistic, by including transition equations for stocks of pollutants, or
natural resources (depletable or renewable) human capital, or uncertainty
in the evolution of the economy. These extensions will provide better in-
sights regarding the sustainability conditions of economies and our ability to
provide meaningful estimates of these conditions.
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t ; then we have:
￿
￿ + (￿ + ￿ + m + g)￿(1 ￿ a) = (1 ￿ a)s; which is linear in ￿ (52)
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replacing ￿t = ^ k
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￿ + ￿ + m + g
￿ 1
1￿a
Following the procedure above and by using instead of ^ y = ^ ka which is the
typical Cobb-Douglas production function, ^ y = (1 ￿ z ￿ P)^ ka the accumulation
of capital in per e⁄ective worker terms becomes:
￿
^ kt = s(1 ￿ z ￿ P)^ k
a
t ￿ (￿ + ￿ + g)^ kt ￿ m^ kt + z




















t + (￿ + ￿ + m + g)^ k
1￿a
t = s(1 ￿ z ￿ P) (55)








t ; then we have:
￿
￿ + (￿ + ￿ + m + g)￿(1 ￿ a) = (1 ￿ a)s(1 ￿ z ￿ P); which is linear in ￿ (56)
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